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Abstract: Walker and Karsten are two important decisions in disability discrimi-
nation law – not solely on the basis of their legal and practical repercussions for 
the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU), respectively, but because 
they capture the very ideological spirit of domestic and European anti-discrimi-
nation legislation. The former directly relates to disability discrimination in the 
UK and the entire EU is feeling the brunt of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s decision in the latter. This article explores the impact of both these deci-
sions and to what extent the obese or those suffering from a functional overlay 
are now protected from being discriminated against by the Framework Directive 
2000/78 and the United Kingdom’s Equality Act 2010.
Keywords: obesity; functional overlay; disability discrimination; equal 
treatment.
Introduction
Discrimination law in the United Kingdom (UK) has been through some radical 
changes for instance the Equality Act 20101 rationalised the law and introduced 
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1 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 was amended to accord with the Framework Directive 
(2000/78/EC of 27th November 2000) that established a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation. Therefore, fewer changes were made in the Equality Act 2010. 
The Directive continuously applies on UK law and practice that remain inconsistent with it or 
perhaps are unclear – the latter would require interpretation in accordance with it. See: Paterson 
v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis UKEAT/0635/06/LA and The Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities A/RES/61/106. Note the Convention has an Optional Protocol. 
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the notion of protected characteristics.2 Obesity is a growing crisis across the 
world; in 20 years the number of “obese” people in England doubled from 13.2% 
to 24.4%. More recent conservative estimates suggest that this figure could rise 
to one third of the population by 2020.3 Therefore, any decision that results in 
obesity and/or its effects being protected under the current legislative regime 
against disability discrimination could potentially create a raft of new and poten-
tially very interesting litigation. It also creates an additional cause for employ-
ers to be concerned with. Two notable cases have brought the issue of whether 
obesity, or at the very least the functional overlay caused by it, amounts to a pro-
tected characteristic (disability) to the limelight. This article compares the two 
decisions and their impact on equality law in the UK.
European Union Law – The Framework Directive 
2000/78/EC
The European Union’s Framework Directive 2000/78/EC established the general 
structure under which member states can promote equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation so as to combat discrimination on the grounds of religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation with the view to putting into affect 
the principle of equal treatment in all European Union member states.4 Discrimi-
nation also presents an impediment to the right of member state citizens to move 
freely throughout the union.5
2 The Equality Act 2010 defines protected characteristics as age, disability, gender reassign-
ment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion and belief, sex 
and sexual orientation. Note in relation to same sex marriage the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
Act 2013. 
3 Health and Social Care Information Centre. Statistics on Obesity, Physical Activity and Diet 
– England, 2014. Published online 26th of February 2014. (Date accessed: July 2014). The Univer-
sity of Birmingham’s Centre for Obesity Research also reports on the rates of obesity in the UK, 
see: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/mds/centres/obesity/obesity-uk/index.
aspx.
4 See Chapter 1 Article 1. 
5 On free movement see: Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe of the 16th April 2014 on Measures that facilitate the exercise of the rights that are con-
ferred upon workers in the context of their freedom of movement. (ONLINE) Available at: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32014L0054. (Accessed 14th  January 
2016).
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United Kingdom Law – Disability under the 
Equality Act 2010
Equality in the UK seeks to promote the right of people to be treated fairly, or 
at least that is the basis of its legal premise. To this endeavor a number of char-
acteristics are protected (as stated earlier). In terms of disability discrimination, 
the statutory regime covers indirect discrimination and discrimination that 
arises from disability.6 The latter was a change that was introduced as part of the 
Equality Act 2010 after the House of Lords decision in Lewisham London Borough 
Council vs. Malcolm (2008) UKHL 43. The effect of the Malcolm judgment was to 
limit the meaning of disability related discrimination thereby severely restricting 
the scope of disabled people to claim that they had been treated less favourably. 
This position was clearly contrary to policy intention of the government that was 
to protect the disabled from less favourable treatment. Up and until 2010 UK law 
had developed somewhat on a rather piecemeal basis, it was fragmented by the 
fact that it was contained in a variety of Acts and Regulations and therefore it was 
in urgent need to be brought together in a coherent and clear piece of legislation. 
The EA 2010 did achieve this, and that I do not think many would contest.
The 2010 Act applies what is called a detriment model to protection from vic-
timisation and therefore aligns the approach across anti-discrimination focused 
employment law in the UK. It also harmonised the thresholds set for the duty to 
make reasonable adjustments and extended the protection against harassment 
of employees to include harassment by third parties in relation to all protected 
characteristics. The statute makes it difficult for an employer to unfairly screen 
out disabled people in the recruitment process by restricting the circumstances 
in which questions relating to disability or health can be posed. There is a major 
discrimination issue in terms of screening out candidates on the basis of race and 
other protected characteristics, which is one of the reasons behind the proposal 
to anonymise the identity of an applicant on their application forms.7
6 Note: the EA 2010 also includes protection from “associated discrimination” and there was 
discussion to include a duty on an employer to provide protection from discrimination by “third 
parties,” however this was highly contentious and never brought into force. Employers felt that 
these two categories of protection from discrimination were too wide. 
7 Note: whilst there are obvious benefits to this the neutralising of application forms may only 
delay discrimination to later on in the recruitment process and this requires that candidates ema-
nate from structurally similar groups applicant groups. See also: PM: Time to end discrimination 
and finish the fight for real equality – Press releases – GOV.UK. 2016. PM: Time to end discrimina-
tion and finish the fight for real equality. Press releases, GOV.UK. (ONLINE) Available at: https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-time-to-end-discrimination-and-finish-the-fight-for-real-
equality. (Accessed 14 January 2016).
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The Framework Directive, Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) and the 
Equality Act 2010 (EA) did not expressly prohibit discrimination on the grounds 
of obesity and as a result some interesting case law has brought change to this 
area of the law.
Obesity and Functional Overlay
Obesity is defined as simply having too much fat on the body. The measure used 
to ascertain this is known as the body mass index (BMI), this uses a simple cal-
culation; the ratio of a person’s height and weight (BMI = kg/m2). A healthy BMI 
for a male or female lies between 18.5 and 24.9, persons considered overweight 
have a BMI that lies between 25 and 29.9, those classed as obese have a BMI of 
over 30 and persons considered to be morbidly obese have a BMI of over 40. Often 
having a BMI far in excess of this (obesity or morbid obesity). Functional overlay 
is defined as the response or excessive reaction to, or emotional aspect of an 
organic physical disease. This may be caused by an overreaction to an illness and 
it usually characterised by symptoms that have a continual effect long after the 
disease that caused them has ended.8 The diagnosis of functional overlay9 is dif-
ficult and often as a result of the physician not being able to find any other cause 
for the symptoms complained of – note: this does not mean that they do not exist. 
However, if to be used as evidence then it must be implied that the physician must 
be sure that the symptoms are not malingering – a feigned symptom. Although, 
it is a point to be noted that the genuineness of neither the symptoms nor their 
cause was ever challenged in Walker.
Walker v Sita Information Networking Computing 
Ltd UKEAT 0097/12
The case fell under the DDA 1995, which has now been replaced by the EA 2010. 
Walker worked for Sita Information Networking Computing Limited. He claimed 
that he was disabled which his employer challenged. Walker contended that he 
genuinely suffered from, amongst other things, asthma, diabetes, high blood 
pressure, chronic fatigue syndrome, bowel and stomach problems, knee prob-
8 Mosby’s Medical Dictionary. 8th Edition, 2009. Elsevier. 
9 See: Romberg, W. Functional overlay: An illegitimate diagnosis? Forensic Medicine. West J Med 
130:561–565, June 1979. 
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lems and sacro-iliac joint pains, chemical sensitivity, anxiety and depression, 
persistent cough, hearing loss, fungal infections, carpal tunnel syndrome and 
eye problems. An magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan had revealed a bulging 
disc in his spine between C6 and C7 level. As a result these conditions gave rise 
to a number of symptoms which included pain in the abdomen, head, knees, left 
leg and knee, lower back, left arm and shoulder, both his feet and diarrhoea, dif-
ficulty swallowing, shortness of breath, constant fatigue and poor concentration/
memory. The existence of these symptoms was not a matter in issue.
He contended that he was suffering from a number of symptoms that caused 
him significant difficulty in his ability to conduct his day-to-day life. It was clear 
from the medical evidence of Doctor Davies (an occupational health specialist) 
that Walker suffered from a permanent condition that affected his daily life and 
that his obesity, at the time he weighed 21.5 stones,10 had significantly contributed 
towards them. Furthermore, anyone carrying that much weight would experience 
some of the symptoms he was complaining of. The doctor also concluded that a 
functional or behavioral part played a significant part in the existence of a wide 
range of the symptoms outlined. The mental or pathological cause of the symp-
toms could not be attributed nor was there any significant structural changes 
(physical) that would have led to a significant impairment or disability. These 
were therefore to be regarded as being a functional overlay. The question for 
the tribunals was whether the definition of disability (and statutory protection) 
included someone who suffered from a functional overlay that was accentuated 
by obesity and was obesity an impairment as required by the statute.
At first instance the employment tribunal (ET) judge held that because no 
cause for the mental or physical symptoms could be identified the claimant did 
not fall within the definition of a disabled person under the DDA scheme. The 
judge also stated that the cause of the claimant’s impairment was not a disability 
but his obesity and therefore concluded that Walker had no claim in disability 
discrimination law. In his judgment the judge concluded:
“11. The respondent resists the claim of disability on a narrow basis. Mrs. Winstone, counsel 
for the respondent, does not challenge Mr. Walker’s account of his symptoms. She says that 
the wording of the Act is such that the claimant must establish a physical or mental impair-
ment. There is no suggestion of any mental illness causing the functional overlay, though in 
the absence of objective evidence of a physical impairment she invites me to say that if the 
functional overlay is disregarded the symptoms do not amount to a disability. Not so, says 
Mr. Walker, who invites me to take him as I find him and have overall regard to his condition 
as a whole.
10 The additional weight that he was carrying was stated as being equivalent to a 90lb bag of 
sand. 
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12. I have given this matter careful consideration. Mr. Walker presents as a man who has 
difficulties in his life but I have to determine this issue having regard to the framework of 
the act. The position is that, put shortly, in the absence of any mental condition Doctor 
Davies has been unable to identify any physical or organic cause for Mr. Walker’s conditions 
apart, to a degree, from his obesity. I have been referred to a number of authorities includ-
ing McNicol v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd (2002) EWCA Civ. 1074 and the cases of 
Rugamer v Sony Music Entertainment (UK), McNicol v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd, 
reported at 2002 ICR 381. These cases are authority for the proposition that, depending on 
the facts of the instant case, it is open to a tribunal to conclude that an individual is not 
disabled where there is no physical or organic cause for his symptoms. So it is here, I find 
that there is no such cause for the claimant’s symptoms and that they are exacerbated by a 
functional overlay.”
Walker appealed, the employment appeal tribunal (EAT) held in his favour 
stating that the ET judge had erred in law because the legislation did not require 
the court to determine the cause of the mental impairment but to have regard to 
its effect. The basic issue started with the fact that section 1 (1) of the DDA 1995 
stated that disability was “a physical or mental impairment, which has a substan-
tial and long-term adverse effect upon (someone) to carry out normal day to day 
activities”. The term “impairment” was not defined and therefore in accordance 
with general principles of English law was to be given its “natural” meaning.11 In 
addition reference also had to be made to the Guidance12 provided with the Act 
on what should be taken into consideration when determining questions relating 
to the definition of disability. Paragraph A8 of Part 2 of the Guidance to the Act 
clearly stated that “It not necessary to consider how an impairment is caused, 
even if the cause is a consequence of a condition which is excluded… what it 
is important to consider the effect of an impairment, not its cause.”13 It is clear 
that, as a matter of law, the cause of the impairment is not relevant. Paragraph 
19 of McNicol v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd (2002) EWCA Civ 1074 and 
11 In English law there are a number of rules of statutory construction, the literal rule when ap-
plied gives the terms in a statute an ordinary or natural meaning. The purpose of interpretation 
here is clearly to respect the intention of Parliament and avoid usurping the function of the leg-
islature. See: Lord Simonds in Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation 
(1952) AC 189 at page 191. For a classic example for the application of the rule see: Fisher v Bell 
(1961) 1 QB 394. 
12 Disability Discrimination Act – Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining 
questions relating to the definition of disability. 
13 Page 5 of the original Guidance. Note: the same is provided by the Guidance that accompanies 
the Equality Act 2010 at paragraph A3 on page 8. See: Equality Act 2010: Guidance on matters 
to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of disability. 2015. 
(ONLINE) Available at: http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/
EqualityAct/odi_equality_act_guidance_may.pdf. (Date accessed: 13th March 2015).
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the judgment in The College of Ripon & York St John v Hobbs (2002) IRLR 185 also 
supported this contention.
It has been argued that had the existence of the symptoms been challenged 
then the ET would have been well within its rights to question the absence of a 
cause to which to attribute them – this was not the case here. Evidentially this 
would have been a significant fact that may well have helped determine whether 
the symptoms were malingering. The employment judge at first instance did not 
refer to the Guidance that accompanied the DDA and had relied on authorities 
that were no longer relevant under the current legislative regime. The EAT held 
that Walker was both mentally and physically impaired and had been in such 
state for a long time. Whilst the EAT did not directly accept that obesity is a dis-
ability under the DDA scheme it did recognise that an obese person is more likely 
to be disabled. Therefore, an obese claimant was more likely to persuade an ET 
that he or she suffered from impairment for the purposes of the law so as to be 
afforded protection. The result rendered Walker disabled for the purposes of the 
DDA at the time.
Advocate General’s Opinion in FOA, acting on 
behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Billund Kommune 
Case C-354/13 ECJ
In 2010 the Billund City Council (a Danish local authority) dismissed a child-
minder after he had been too obese to bend over and tie-up shoelaces. Karsten 
weighed well over 25 stone (160 kg). The World Health Organisation classifies this 
as severe, extreme or morbid obesity (class III). He contended that his weight was 
one of the reasons for his dismissal and that this amounted to unfair disability 
discrimination,14 the council denied this. The following questions were referred 
by the Danish Courts for a preliminary ruling to the Advocate General (AG) of the 
European Union:
 – Is it contrary to European Union law (EU law) as expressed, for example, in 
Article 6 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) concerning fundamental rights, 
14 The Lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling pa arbejdsmarkedet mv. (Forskelsbehandling-
sloven) lovbekendtgørelse nr. 1349 af 16. December 2008. This is the law on the prohibition of 
discrimination in the labour market (etc.). Consolidated Law No. 1349 of 16 December 2008, see 
paras.1, 2(1), 2a and 7a. Directive 2000/78 was implemented in Danish law via an amendment to 
the Forskelsbehandlingsloven. 
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generally or particularly for a public-sector employer to discriminate on 
grounds of obesity in the labour market?
 – If there is a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of obesity, is it directly 
applicable as between a Danish citizen and his employer, a public authority?
 – Should the court find that there is a prohibition under EU law of discrimi-
nation on grounds of obesity in the labour market generally or in particu-
lar for public-sector employers, is the assessment as to whether action has 
been taken contrary to a potential prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of obesity in that case to be conducted with a shared burden of proof, with 
the result that the actual implementation of the prohibition in cases where 
proof of such discrimination has been made out requires that the burden of 
proof be placed on the respondent/defendant employer (see recital 18 in the 
preamble to Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of 
proof in cases of discrimination based on sex 1)?
 – Can obesity be deemed to be a handicap covered by the protection provided 
for in Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 2 
and, if so, which criteria will be decisive for the assessment as to whether 
a person’s obesity means specifically that that person is protected by the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of handicap as laid down in that 
directive?
The first three questions related to whether obesity could be considered as a ground 
of discrimination in its own right. If the answer were yes then the act complained 
of would be unlawful by reason of the prohibition of discrimination in EU law. In 
absence of an express provision providing protection the question whether it could 
be afforded by implication under any of the existing provisions in European Union 
fundamental rights law that dealt with disability also required consideration. Ques-
tion number four asked whether obesity could be included within the notion of 
disability as set out in Directive 2000/78. The answer for the first, and therefore sub-
sequent two questions, were in the negative. In the AG’s opinion was there is no 
general principle in EU law that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of obesity 
in its own right nor could it be implied by reason of any other provision (discussed 
later). However, in relation to question four he went on to state that morbid obesity 
may fall within the definition of “disability” for the purposes of the Equal Treatment 
Directive (2000/78/EC) if the degree of obesity is such that it hinders an individual 
from fully participating in their professional life on an equal footing with other 
employees.
What follows is a brief summary of the AG’s response to the first three ques-
tions. In terms of Article 6 (1) of the TEU and the first three questions; the four 
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European Treaty provisions that address disability are Articles 10 and 19 of the 
Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)15 – the former sets 
out the aim to combat discrimination and the latter the legal basis for doing so. 
Articles 21 and 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(EU Charter 2000/C 364/01), respectively, prohibit discrimination on particular 
grounds including disability and for those with disability to be able to benefit from 
the protections provided in the form of independence, occupational and social 
integration, and to be able to live and participate in community life. Although 
the drafting of Article 21 allowed some argument for inclusion of grounds not 
expressly stated it was quite clear that this would be futile.16 Clearly obesity was 
not expressly protected in any of these provisions or in any other principle of EU 
law. It is clear from the AG’s opinion that in the absence of express prohibition 
European Union fundamental rights law requires a specific degree of connection 
that is beyond close relation or oblique impact between the legal issue and EU 
law.17 Therefore, a generalised connection is not enough to engage the protec-
tion of European Union fundamental rights at a national level because this would 
breach the boundaries that have already been set.18
In terms of question four “can obesity be classed as a disability so as to afford 
someone protection under the Framework Directive”. The Directive did not define 
disability19 and therefore the CJEU had been quite active on this issue in terms 
of its jurisprudence. The interpretation of disability as in accordance with the 
United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities20 which itself 
accepts disability as being a concept that is continually evolving. The AG stated 
15 The TFEU (named by Lisbon Treaty as such) was formerly known as the EC Treaty and the 
Treaty of Rome. It sets out the functional and organisational details of the European Union. 
16 The AG acknowledged that Article 6(1) of the TEU precluded recourse to the Charter for the 
purposes of extending the competencies of the European Union as defined in its Treaties. The 
following cases set out the extent of fundamental rights law in the European Union: Åklagaren v 
Hans Åkerberg Fransson. Case C-617/10 REC and Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland. (2013) 
2 CMLR 46. Case C-370/12. 
17 Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo. 
(2014) CJEU Case C-206/13. The point of the AG here was that there must be a specific member 
state provision that falls within a specific provision of European Union law, see: Sociedade Ag-
rícola e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio Lda v Instituto da Segurança Social IP. (2013) EUECJ 
C-258/13. Clearly this was not the case here. 
18 See ibid. note 13. 
19 See: Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA. (2006) EUECj Case C-13/05.
20 For details of the approval see: Council Decision 2010/48/EC of the 26th of November 2009 
(OJ 2010 L 23). See also: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 2015. (ONLINE) 
Available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml. (Date accessed: 
13th March 2015).
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that the CJEU had emphasised that the purpose of the Directive was to combat 
disability discrimination in all its forms.21 The AG concluded, in line with the 
CJEU, that the notion of disability for the purposes of the Directive must include 
all persons that have a disability that corresponds to the CJEU’s jurisprudential 
definition.22 Therefore, an illness, whether curable or not, that accords with this 
definition would be covered by Directive 2000/78.23 The CJEU clearly held that 
it would be in contradiction of the Directive to define the scope of disability by 
reference to its origin.
The CJEU’s Decision in Karsten
In December 2014 the CJEU made its decision,24 this accorded with the AG’s 
opinion and thus impacts the entire European Union. The reasoning was as 
follows: “while no general principle of EU law prohibits, in itself, discrimina-
tion on grounds of obesity, that condition falls within the concept of “disability” 
where, under particular conditions, it hinders the full and effective participa-
tion of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers”.
Significance for UK Business/Employers
The definition of disability from the DDA 1995 to the EA 2010 remains unchanged 
and therefore Karsten is relevant to all claims relating to disability discrimina-
tion. Employers are required to be aware that whilst obesity in itself may not be 
expressly classed as a disability or labelled as a protected characteristic it may 
mean that an employee who is obese is disabled for the purposes of the law and 
entitled to reasonable adjustments. Few would argue that the extension of protec-
tion often bears no cost – this decision will see employers having to make adjust-
21 Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law. (2008) EUECJ Case C-303/06.
22 The CJEU has stated the disability must be limitations that occur from a long-term, physical, 
mental or psychological impairment which when in interaction with various barriers can hinder 
a person’s full and effective participation in professional life when compared to other workers on 
an equal basis. See also: Commission v Italy. (2013) CJEU C-312/11. 
23 See ibid. note 16 (Chacón). 
24 See: Fag og Arbejde (FOA), acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Kommunernes Landsforening 
(KL), acting on behalf of the Municipality of Billund. Case C-354/13. Available at: http://curia.eu-
ropa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-12/cp140183en.pdf.
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ments in the workplace to accommodate the individual needs of an employee who 
is severely obese with a BMI of over 40.25 For instance, the employer may need to 
limit the duties of such an employee to those that do not require a certain level of 
physical fitness, provide special or modified equipment (chair/desk) and ensure 
fairness in the recruitment process because of this. For example, if an applicant 
is refused employment by reason of their obesity then they may have a potential 
claim under disability discrimination law. Even instances of banter that relate to 
an obese persons appearance in the office may result in a harassment claim. The 
limitation to those severely obese seems sensible but it is postulated that employ-
ers will have to take care in relation to any obese employees otherwise they leave 
themselves open for criticism and potential claims.
Conclusion
Both these decisions show that legislative framework prohibiting disability 
discrimination includes impairment caused by a particular level of obesity or 
morbid obesity – what is important is the effect that it has on a person’s ability 
to conduct their professional life. Walker explored the functional overlay (emo-
tional response/mental impairment) and Karsten firmly deals with obesity itself. 
These decisions may open the floodgates for other conditions to be given the 
same status. The CJEU confirmed that a tribunal is open to investigate the dis-
ability and its effects. However, the ET is not necessarily the best place to explore 
whether a disability is feigned. Although the UK courts did not recognise obesity 
as a disability in its own right – the decision in Walker made some inroads into 
this. The decision in Karsten means that the results of extreme, severe or morbid 
obesity can be classed as a disability under the Framework Directive. The deci-
sion of the CJEU is significant for the UK because the current regime of protection 
is predominantly based on the latter and therefore employers and service provid-
ers must take steps to ensure they do not fall foul of the law.
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